Thursday, May 05, 2005
NGO Consulting-Mckinsey Report on Bangladesh
Extracts of Varun Gauri-Member, World Bank & Vice President-Mckinsey & Co; London
NGO's In Bangladesh-Activities, Resources, and Governance
Examples of low service quality:
Bangladesh-Absenteeism rates for doctors in primary health care centers: 74 percent
Zimbabwe: 13 percent of respondents gave as a reason for not delivering babies in public facilities that “nurses hit mothers during delivery”
Guinea: 70 percent of government drugs disappeared
Increasing public spending is not enough
* Percent deviation from rate predicted by GDP per capita
Source: Spending and GDP from World Development Indicators database. School completion from Bruns, Mingat and Rakatomalala 2003
Similar changes in public spending can be associated with vastly different changes in outcomes
Market Failure and State Failure in Service Delivery: Are NGOs the Answer ?
Altruism to overcome incomplete contracts
Flexibility for allocative and productive efficiency
47% of World Bank projects involved NGOs/CBOs (1997)
37% of USAID budget channeled through NGOs (2001)
Even Jesse Helms likes development NGOs
Theories about what makes NGOs tick?
Altruism
Benefits for founders and managers
Worker control
LITTLE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
‘Massive proliferation’ of NGOs in Bangladesh
27,000 registered with MSA, 1600 with NAB
90% of villages have an NGO (2000)
One large NGO claimed to have reached 70% of villages and 70 million people (2003)
Largest NGOs employ 10 to 70 thousand staff members
About 10% of ODA channeled through NGOs
Business entrepreneurs: cell phones, dairy, publishing, handicrafts
A bit of history
Bangladesh began as a nearly ‘failed state’ in 1971 due to civil war and cyclones of 1972
Recurrent floods and cyclones (1988 and 1991)
Donors poured resources into NGOs
NGOs moved from humanitarian relief and reconstruction to ‘development’ tasks
NGOs moved from ‘consciousness raising’ to ‘service provision’
Donors encouraged self-sufficiency
Conflicts with the state
1991 NGO Affairs Bureau established
1991-2002 slow approval process, transparency issues and for-profit activities
2001-2003 perceived politicization of NGOs
2003 division of apex body
2004 push for new regulations
Objectives of the Survey
Descriptive statistics
NGO characteristics
Community perceptions
What works?
Pilot survey for use in other contexts
Sampling Overview
Thana selection
35 chosen; random sampling weighted by NGO activity
Within each thana:
Divided into ‘big’ NGOs and ‘other’ NGOs
Sample 100 ‘big’ NGOs
Collect lists of other NGOs during ‘big’ interviews
Choose six other NGOs in each thana randomly from list
Methodology
NGO interview
Conducted with branch managers
Quantitative and qualitative data collected on a range of aspects of NGO operations
Focus group
Conducted with selection of community members / NGO clients
Qualitative perceptions of NGO services and activities
Questionnaires
NGO survey topics
Activities
Sources and uses of funds
Relations with community, other NGO’s, government
Governance structures
Focus group topics
Various measures of NGO ‘performance’
Community characteristics
Field Implementation
Field implementation: March – April 2003
Six ‘other’ NGOs refused interviews
Only 2 ‘other’ NGOs in two thanas
One NGO in operation for less than one year
Field staff interviewed only four NGOs in one thana
193 ‘other’ NGOs in sample, 310 total
Table 1: Number of NGOs in each selected thana on initial list, updated based on enumeration, and surveyed
What do NGOs do?
Sectors and Activities
131 NGOs lobby national government
97 NGOs had at least one meeting with national government in last year
93 at least one meeting with local government
58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with national
58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with local
NGO Resources
Finances and staff
Dominant source of fund is fee for service:
Full sample: 50% of funds
Big NGOs: 62% of funds
Other NGOs: 43% of funds
Membership fees – common but small amounts
Over 90% of organizations collect membership fees
Represent less than 3% of overall revenues
Fraction of organizations with other sources of revenues
Specialized Labor: Summary
Teaching is most prevalent type of skilled labor
Majority of NGOs that provide education services have skilled teachers (67%)
Relatively few healthcare organizations employ doctors or nurses (31% and 25%)
Median size and labor intensity of NGOs
Constraints on improvement
Constraints: Summary
Smaller NGOs report greater resource constraints
Government restrictions are not an (self-reported) impediment
Governance
Autonomy, Evaluation, Participation, Accountability, and Management
Which decisions are made by the NGO without consulting the supervising branch/headquarters?
Percentage of NGOs needing permission from an oversight committee to perform the specified activities
How the NGO manager was chosen
Methods used by NGOs to collect information about community needs
Percentage of NGOs involving community members in provision of services
Methods used by NGOs to collect feedback about how well they are meeting community needs
Employee Review
Additional elements of accountability
Auditing of accounts: 70%
Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOs
Donor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agency
Ever visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36%
Ever visited by thana/local government: 55%
Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%
Employee Review
Additional elements of accountability
Auditing of accounts: 70%
Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOs
Donor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agency
Ever visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36%
Ever visited by thana/local government: 55%
Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%
Characteristics of NGO managers
Summary: An Institutional Isomorphism
Branch and headquarters structure
Overwhelming focus on credit services
Service fees / operations main sources of revenue
Salaried and professional staff, not volunteers
No religious affiliation
Partnerships, little sub-contracting w/ government
Middle-class, college-educated male managers
Focus group summary:
Qualitative and quantitative measures of NGO performance:
NGO efficiency at providing services relative to community
NGO efficiency at providing services relative to local government
Perceived ‘self-servingness’ of NGO
Performance rating of NGOs
NGOs are perceived to be approximately as efficient at providing services as communities themselves
NGOs are perceived to be significantly more efficient at providing services than the government
(Performance rating = allocation out of 100)
Correlates of Success & Community Perceptions
Direct evaluation by supervisor
Direct community feedback
Involvement of community members in project execution
NGO's In Bangladesh-Activities, Resources, and Governance
Examples of low service quality:
Bangladesh-Absenteeism rates for doctors in primary health care centers: 74 percent
Zimbabwe: 13 percent of respondents gave as a reason for not delivering babies in public facilities that “nurses hit mothers during delivery”
Guinea: 70 percent of government drugs disappeared
Increasing public spending is not enough
* Percent deviation from rate predicted by GDP per capita
Source: Spending and GDP from World Development Indicators database. School completion from Bruns, Mingat and Rakatomalala 2003
Similar changes in public spending can be associated with vastly different changes in outcomes
Market Failure and State Failure in Service Delivery: Are NGOs the Answer ?
Altruism to overcome incomplete contracts
Flexibility for allocative and productive efficiency
47% of World Bank projects involved NGOs/CBOs (1997)
37% of USAID budget channeled through NGOs (2001)
Even Jesse Helms likes development NGOs
Theories about what makes NGOs tick?
Altruism
Benefits for founders and managers
Worker control
LITTLE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
‘Massive proliferation’ of NGOs in Bangladesh
27,000 registered with MSA, 1600 with NAB
90% of villages have an NGO (2000)
One large NGO claimed to have reached 70% of villages and 70 million people (2003)
Largest NGOs employ 10 to 70 thousand staff members
About 10% of ODA channeled through NGOs
Business entrepreneurs: cell phones, dairy, publishing, handicrafts
A bit of history
Bangladesh began as a nearly ‘failed state’ in 1971 due to civil war and cyclones of 1972
Recurrent floods and cyclones (1988 and 1991)
Donors poured resources into NGOs
NGOs moved from humanitarian relief and reconstruction to ‘development’ tasks
NGOs moved from ‘consciousness raising’ to ‘service provision’
Donors encouraged self-sufficiency
Conflicts with the state
1991 NGO Affairs Bureau established
1991-2002 slow approval process, transparency issues and for-profit activities
2001-2003 perceived politicization of NGOs
2003 division of apex body
2004 push for new regulations
Objectives of the Survey
Descriptive statistics
NGO characteristics
Community perceptions
What works?
Pilot survey for use in other contexts
Sampling Overview
Thana selection
35 chosen; random sampling weighted by NGO activity
Within each thana:
Divided into ‘big’ NGOs and ‘other’ NGOs
Sample 100 ‘big’ NGOs
Collect lists of other NGOs during ‘big’ interviews
Choose six other NGOs in each thana randomly from list
Methodology
NGO interview
Conducted with branch managers
Quantitative and qualitative data collected on a range of aspects of NGO operations
Focus group
Conducted with selection of community members / NGO clients
Qualitative perceptions of NGO services and activities
Questionnaires
NGO survey topics
Activities
Sources and uses of funds
Relations with community, other NGO’s, government
Governance structures
Focus group topics
Various measures of NGO ‘performance’
Community characteristics
Field Implementation
Field implementation: March – April 2003
Six ‘other’ NGOs refused interviews
Only 2 ‘other’ NGOs in two thanas
One NGO in operation for less than one year
Field staff interviewed only four NGOs in one thana
193 ‘other’ NGOs in sample, 310 total
Table 1: Number of NGOs in each selected thana on initial list, updated based on enumeration, and surveyed
What do NGOs do?
Sectors and Activities
131 NGOs lobby national government
97 NGOs had at least one meeting with national government in last year
93 at least one meeting with local government
58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with national
58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with local
NGO Resources
Finances and staff
Dominant source of fund is fee for service:
Full sample: 50% of funds
Big NGOs: 62% of funds
Other NGOs: 43% of funds
Membership fees – common but small amounts
Over 90% of organizations collect membership fees
Represent less than 3% of overall revenues
Fraction of organizations with other sources of revenues
Specialized Labor: Summary
Teaching is most prevalent type of skilled labor
Majority of NGOs that provide education services have skilled teachers (67%)
Relatively few healthcare organizations employ doctors or nurses (31% and 25%)
Median size and labor intensity of NGOs
Constraints on improvement
Constraints: Summary
Smaller NGOs report greater resource constraints
Government restrictions are not an (self-reported) impediment
Governance
Autonomy, Evaluation, Participation, Accountability, and Management
Which decisions are made by the NGO without consulting the supervising branch/headquarters?
Percentage of NGOs needing permission from an oversight committee to perform the specified activities
How the NGO manager was chosen
Methods used by NGOs to collect information about community needs
Percentage of NGOs involving community members in provision of services
Methods used by NGOs to collect feedback about how well they are meeting community needs
Employee Review
Additional elements of accountability
Auditing of accounts: 70%
Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOs
Donor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agency
Ever visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36%
Ever visited by thana/local government: 55%
Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%
Employee Review
Additional elements of accountability
Auditing of accounts: 70%
Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOs
Donor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agency
Ever visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36%
Ever visited by thana/local government: 55%
Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%
Characteristics of NGO managers
Summary: An Institutional Isomorphism
Branch and headquarters structure
Overwhelming focus on credit services
Service fees / operations main sources of revenue
Salaried and professional staff, not volunteers
No religious affiliation
Partnerships, little sub-contracting w/ government
Middle-class, college-educated male managers
Focus group summary:
Qualitative and quantitative measures of NGO performance:
NGO efficiency at providing services relative to community
NGO efficiency at providing services relative to local government
Perceived ‘self-servingness’ of NGO
Performance rating of NGOs
NGOs are perceived to be approximately as efficient at providing services as communities themselves
NGOs are perceived to be significantly more efficient at providing services than the government
(Performance rating = allocation out of 100)
Correlates of Success & Community Perceptions
Direct evaluation by supervisor
Direct community feedback
Involvement of community members in project execution
